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STATE OF THE DISCIPLINES 
 
Foucault and Theology 
 




Theological Appropriations of Foucault 
 
From its emergence in the mid-1980s, theological engagement with the 
thought of Michel Foucault – taking place within the Christian tradition – has 
followed three principal trajectories, reflecting developments in Foucault 
scholarship as well as wider critical debates, and variously negotiating the 
relationship that might be established between Foucault’s thought and 
theology. Sharon Welch inaugurated the first of these trajectories in 1985, 
when, taking up the broader examination of the implications of Foucault’s 
analyses of ‘power-knowledge’ then current in Foucault studies, she utilised 
these analyses toward the construction of a feminist theology of liberation.1 
Subsequently, a number of theologians explored further the critical 
possibilities associated with ‘power-knowledge’ for theologies of liberation,2 
scriptural hermeneutics,3 and practical theology (drawing upon Foucault’s 
                                                 
1 See Sharon D. Welch, Communities of Resistance and Solidarity: A Feminist Theology of 
Liberation. (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1985). Even earlier is the influence of 
Foucault’s work upon the broader study of religion in Bryan S. Turner, Religion and 
Social Theory (London: Sage, 1983). Following Foucault, Turner shifts the emphasis in 
the study of religion from “ideology” to the “body” and, hence, to a “materialistic” 
approach to religion (p. 2). 
2 See Marc P. Lalonde, “Power/Knowledge and Liberation: Foucault as a Parabolic 
Thinker”, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 61:1 (1993), 81-100; Daniel N. 
Hopkins, “Postmodernity, Black Theology of Liberation and the U.S.A.: Michel 
Foucault and James H. Cone”, in David B. Batstone et al., eds., Liberation Theologies, 
Postmodernity and the Americas (London & New York: Routledge, 1997), 205-221. See 
also Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Changing the Subject: Women’s Discourses and 
Feminist Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), in which a poststructuralist 
feminist theology is elaborated, drawing in part upon Foucault. 
3 See Elizabeth A. Castelli, Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power (Louisville and 
Westminster: John Knox Press, 1991); idem., “Interpretations of Power in 1 
Corinthians”, Semeia 54 (1992) 199-222, reprinted in James Bernauer and Jeremy 
Carrette, eds., Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics of Religious Experience (London: 
Ashgate, 2004), 19-38; Stephen D. Moore, God’s Gym: Divine Male Bodies of the Bible 
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analyses of “pastoral power”, in particular),4 while these analyses were also 
applied to the broader study of religion.5 With these utilisations of his 
thought, a pattern was established of applying certain of Foucault’s critical 
tools and conceptualisations to a variety of theological questions – a pattern, 
which would be expanded as more points of contact between his work and 
theology came to light, with his later work explored for its contribution to 
scholarly understanding of early Christian writings,6 his ethics for its import 
for moral theology,7 and his genealogical histories for its effect upon the 
theology of tradition,8 to name just some of these recent engagements with his 
work.9  
                                                                                                                                            
(London and New York: Routledge, 1996). For an earlier version of some of this 
material see Moore, Poststructuralism and the New Testament: Derrida and Foucault at the 
Foot of the Cross (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994). See also, Heather A., McKay, “She 
Said to Him, He Said to Her: Power Talk in the Bible or Foucault Listens at the 
Keyhole”, Biblical Theology Bulletin 28:2 (1998), 45-51. Another theological application 
of Foucault’s analyses of power is to be found in Kyle A. Pasework, A Theology of 
Power: Being Beyond Domination (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993). 
4 See Wege zum Menschen 47 (1995) with the following articles: Eva Erdmann, “Die 
Macht unserer Kirchenväter. Über ‘die Geständnisse des Fleisches’”, 53-60; M 
Weimer, “Das Verdrängte in der Hirtenmetaphor. Kritische Reflexionen zu Foucaults 
Begriff des ‘Pastorats’”, 61-76; N. Mette, “‘Pastoral Macht’. Praktisch-theologische 
Anmerkungen zu einem Theorem M. Foucaults”, 76-83; Hermann Steinkamp, “Die 
‘Seele’ – ‘Illusion der Theologen’. Michel Foucaults Bestimmung der ‘Seele’ an die 
Seelsorge”, 84-93; Susan .J. Dunlap, Counselling Depressed Women: Counselling and 
Pastoral Theology (Westminster: John Knox Press 1998), which draws on Foucault’s 
theory of power; Hermann Steinkamp, Die sanfte Macht der Hirten. Die Bedeutung 
Michel Foucaults fur die praktische Theologie (Mainz: Grünewald, 1999). A further recent 
application of Foucault’s thought to practical theology, which shifts the emphasis 
from his analysis of power to that of subjectivity, is that of Claudia Kolf-van Melis, 
Tod des Subjeks? Praktische Theologie in Auseinandersetzung mit Michel Foucaults 
Subjetkritik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003).  
5 In addition to the work of Bryan Turner cited in note 1, the influence of Foucault 
upon the study of religion is to be found in David Chidester, “Michel Foucault and 
the Study of Religion”, Religious Studies Review 12:1 (1986), 1-9; Catherine Bell, Ritual 
Theory, Ritual Practice (New York: Oxford, 1992); Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion 
(Baltimore: Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
6 Elizabeth A. Clark, “Foucault, the Fathers, and Sex”, Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion 56 (1998), 619-641, reprinted in Bernauer and Carrette, eds., Michel Foucault 
and Theology, 39-56; John Behr, “Shifting Sands: Foucault, Brown and the Framework 
of Christian Asceticism”, The Heythrop Journal 34:1 (1993), 1-21. 
7 Marcus Pfannkuchen, Archäologie der Moral. Zur Relevanz von Michel Foucault für die 
theologische Ethik (Münster: LIT, 2000). 
8 James M. Byrne, “Foucault on Continuity: The Postmodern Challenge to Tradition”, 
Faith and Philosophy 9:3 (1992), 335-352. 
9 In addition see Stephen A. Ray, The Modern Soul: Michel Foucault and the Theological 
Discourse of Gordon Kaufman and David Tracy (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987); Grace 
Jantzen, Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995); David O’Toole, Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on 
118 
McSweeney: Foucault and Theology 
 These readings open up important perspectives upon the challenges 
and possibilities of Foucault’s thought for theological knowledge and 
constitute valuable projects in their own right – as when Elizabeth Castelli 
demonstrates the power relations inaugurated by St. Paul’s call to the early 
churches to imitate his apostolic example, or when Grace Jantzen develops a 
critical, gendered genealogy of Christian mysticism.10 However, as 
theological engagements with Foucault, their abstraction of aspects of his 
work from his larger project risks distorting the wider strategic intentions of 
his analyses, as Stephen Carr illustrates in relation to Welch’s deployment of 
Foucault’s notion of power within a Habermasian and Rortyian pragmatics of 
truth.11 Conversely, their application of components of his thought to 
predefined theological questions tends to circumscribe the potential impact of 
his thought upon theology.12  
 
Foucault And Postmodern Theology 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that such applications of Foucault’s thought 
have remained for the most part isolated within their respective disciplines, 
and that the question of the extent of the significance for and compatibility 
                                                                                                                                            
Nihilism, Tragedy, and Apocalypse (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998) which 
develops a metaphysics of tragedy from the work of Foucault and Nietzsche as a 
basis of its theological reflection; Thomas M. Beaudoin, “I Was Imprisoned by 
Subjectivity and You Visited Me: Bonhoeffer and Foucault on the Way to a 
Postmodern Christian Self”, Currents in Theology 29:5 (2002), 341-361; idem., 
“Foucault-Teaching-Theology”, Religious Education 98:1 (2003), 25-42; Vincent Miller, 
Consuming Religion: Christian Faith and Practice in a Consumer Culture (New York: 
Continuum, 2003); Karlheinz Ruhstorfer, Konversionen: Eine theologische Archäologie der 
Bestimmung des Menschen bei Foucault, Nietzsche, Augustine und Paulus (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 2003). 
10 Castelli, Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power; Jantzen, Power, Gender and Christian 
Mysticism. 
11 See Stephen Carr, ‘Foucault Amongst The Theologians’, Sophia 40.2 (2001) 31-45, at 
38.  
12 The recent work of Claudia Kolf-van Melis is instructive here. She pursues a 
dialogue, on the question of subjectivity, between Foucault’s thought and the 
theology of the twentieth-century Catholic theologian Karl Rahner. While she argues 
that Foucault’s treatment of the question is incompatible with the ‘transcendental 
subjectivity’ underpinning Rahner’s ‘dogmatic’ or ‘systematic’ theology, and 
excludes the possibility of dialogue in this sphere, she nonetheless pursues a 
comparison – quite productive on its own terms – between Foucault’s notion of ‘care 
of the self’ and Rahner’s less technical treatment of subjectivity within the sphere of 
practical theology. The effect of this move, however, is that, where Foucault’s 
treatment of subjectivity might be expected to bring the ‘practical’ to bear upon and 
complicate theology’s theoretical or ‘systematic’ viewpoint, Kolf-van Melis’s 
restriction of engagement with Foucault’s work to a ‘practical’ register reinforces the 
divisions within theological discourse which tend to separate the practical and the 
theoretical. See Kolf-van Melis, Tod des Subjekts?, 267ff. 
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with theology of Foucault’s thought has been more widely and acutely 
addressed within a second ‘postmodern’ trajectory of engagement with his 
thought. As broader critical debates concerning postmodernism impacted 
upon theology in the 1990s, theological investigation of Foucault’s thought 
was filtered through the question of the extent to which there can or ought to 
be a ‘postmodern theology’. Here Foucault’s thought, along with that of 
Derrida, Lyotard and others, was typically understood as representative of a 
wider ‘post-modernism’, which, in championing ‘multiplicity’ and 
‘difference’, displaces and succeeds modernity. Consequently, its theological 
significance has typically been determined according to three familiar 
attitudes to postmodernism thus conceived.  
 Firstly, his thought has been drawn upon by what may be described as 
the theologies of “dissolution” of Mark C. Taylor and others, which embrace 
the postmodern as ushering in a post-modern and post-Christian age, with 
which theology must come to terms, and which opens up, in the ruins of 
modernity, new possibilities of (post)theological thought.13 An important 
instance of this approach is provided by Johannes Hoff, who embraces the 
‘destructive’ element of the thought of Foucault and Derrida, but stresses 
their ultimate “deconstructive” intent: their destruction of false stabilities and 
identities constituting a constructive engagement with the aporiae and 
discontinuities of human language and thought.14 Secondly, and by contrast, 
traditional ecclesial theologies have typically concluded that, while Foucault 
offers valuable insights which might be integrated into existing philosophical 
and theological frameworks, on its own terms his work is ultimately prone to 
the relativism that undermines radical postmodernism.15 Consequently, in 
these circles, theological appropriation of Foucault’s work has been rather 
more circumspect. As Saskia Wendel has recently articulated it, one can have 
                                                 
13 Terrence Tilley et al., Postmodern Theologies: The Challenge of Religious Diversity 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1995), viii, 41ff. 
14 Johannes Hoff, Spiritualität und Sprachverlust: Theologie nach Foucault und Derrida 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 1999), 18. 
15 See Stanley Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism (Grand Rapids, Michigan and 
Cambridge, U.K.: William B. Eerdemans Publishing, 1996). Paul Lakeland, 
Postmodernity: Christian Identity in a Fragmented Age (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1997); Anthony Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self: On Meaning, 
Manipulation and Promise (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995). Having achieved a 
significant degree of rapprochement with modern thought, these theologies are 
typically more at home with ‘late modern’ projects, such as that of Jürgen Habermas, 
which seek to reform and extend the modern project, than those which appear to 
radically critique it. See, for example, Don S. Browning and Francis Schüssler 
Fiorenza, eds., Habermas, Modernity and Public Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1992). 
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a theology which “takes up his questions, his criticisms, his analyses”, but 
such a theology “cannot affirmatively adopt Foucault’s perspective”.16  
Thirdly, the emergence of the “radical orthodoxy” movement in the 
theologies of John Milbank, Graham Ward and others has given this 
‘postmodern’ approach a new and more apologetic twist. For these 
theologians, Foucault’s thought shares with postmodernism in general the 
merit of enabling theology to free itself from the tyranny of modernity. 
Nonetheless, it is representative of a postmodern nihilism against which 
theology must articulate its own proper identity.17 An important difference in 
emphasis between Milbank and Ward is noteworthy here. For, while Milbank 
trenchantly argues that Foucault and other ‘postmodern’ thinkers purvey an 
“ontology of violence” entirely incompatible with Christian thought, Ward is 
increasingly sensitive to the degree to which contemporary theology is 
dependent for its form upon other discourses.18 In this regard, Ward 
approaches at least some way toward the more positive attitude of narrative 
theologian Stanley Hauerwas who understands Foucault – by contrast with 
many other postmoderns – as offering to theology a constructive challenge: 
that theologians might do for theology what Foucault has done for thought in 
general.19 Nonetheless, even in this more positive appraisal a clear distinction 
is maintained: Foucault may contribute to shaping the external form of 
theology, but his critical challenge cannot be allowed to affect the core of its 
self-understanding.  
 In its various forms, this second, postmodern trajectory, therefore, 
brings to the fore the question of the extent to which there can be or ought to 
be a theology ‘after’ Foucault. In particular, it highlights how ‘ecclesial’ 
                                                 
16 See Saskia Wendel, “Foucault und/oder Theologie? Chancen und Gefahren einer 
theologischen Rezeption der Philosophie Michel Foucaults”, in C. Bauer and M. 
Hölzl, eds., Gottes und des Menschen Tod? Die Theologie vor der Herausforderung Michel 
Foucaults (Mainz, Grünewald, 2003), 51-65 at 58. A similar evaluation is found in 
several other contributions to this volume. 
17 See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990), 278ff; Graham Ward, “Kulturkritik im Dienste der Theologie. Ein 
Vergleich zwischen Michel Foucault und Pierre Bourdieu”, trans. Michael Hölzl, in 
Bauer and Hölzl, eds., Gottes und des Menschen Tod?, 129-141. In addition, within 
Catholic thought see the recent encyclical, Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio (London: 
Catholic Truth Society, 1998), n.91 which links postmodernity with nihilism, though 
it is less trenchant in its attitude than radical orthodoxy. 
18 See, for instance, Ward, Cultural Transformation and Religious Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), especially 115, where Ward argues that although 
there is no general hermeneutics within which Christianity might be located, 
nonetheless it does not have a pure form. Rather, its “identity is always constituted 
only in relation to.” 
19 Stanley Hauerwas, “The Christian Difference, or Surviving Postmodernism”, in 
Graham Ward, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001), 145-161. 
121 
foucault studies, No 2, pp. 117-144 
theologies increasingly confront the challenge of Foucault’s thought for 
theology with their own concern to articulate, against the legacy of modern 
foundationalism, a “theological theology” that “springs from its own proper 
sources”, rather than having its foundation in ‘secular’ concepts such as 
‘liberation’.20 The critical question these theologies pose concerns how to 
engage with Foucault without installing his thought as a new philosophical 
‘foundation’ – thereby diluting its own proper identity. However, the ultimate 
difficulty for this approach, as Gavin Hyman has demonstrated, is that the 
conception of the postmodern invoked across each of these readings tends to 
repeat the apologetic dichotomy between theology and philosophy prevalent 
in modern thought.21 By interpreting the postmodern as sharply post-
modern, thought is confronted with a direct choice between a modern and a 
postmodern mode of thought, and in turn, theology is confronted with a 
choice for or against a ‘postmodern theology’. Consequently, one can have a 
theology which preserves its identity against Foucault’s ‘dangerous’ project, 
appropriating only that which can be safely integrated within its existing 
worldview, or one can have a thoroughly Foucauldian theology. This 
dilemma allows little room for investigation of the extent to which Foucault’s 
thought might inform or disrupt theology’s self-understanding, nor for how 
theology might welcome and negotiate the challenge of his thought beyond 
ascribing to or rejecting it.22  
 Moreover, as postmodern categories lose something of their analytic 
power in contemporary discourse, it is increasingly doubtful that Foucault’s 
thought can be adequately construed as postmodern.23 In any case, as David 
                                                 
20 Walter Kasper, “Postmodern Dogmatics: Toward a Renewed Discussion of 
Foundations in North America”, Communio 17 (Summer 1990), 181-191, at 191. 
21 Gavin Hyman, The Predicament of Postmodern Theology: Radical Orthodoxy or Nihilist 
Textualism? (Louisville and London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001). 
22 Wendel offers a telling instance of this, when she reveals that the reason that theology 
cannot adopt Foucault’s perspective is that his ‘postfoundational’ philosophy does 
not provide any secure ‘ground’, be it a philosophy of the human subject or of 
freedom, upon which theological knowledge might be articulated. As such, she 
implicitly assumes that a certain kind of philosophy is necessary for theological 
thought and, therefore, cannot engage with Foucault’s whole rethinking of these 
categories in his pursuit of the ‘history of the present’. Wendel, “Foucault und/oder 
Theologie?”, 58. See also Thomas G. Guarino, ‘Fides et Ratio: Theology and 
Contemporary Pluralism’, Theological Studies 62:4 (2001), 675-700, at 693-695. Guarino 
makes the point that in judging postmodernism’s postmetaphysical as tending 
toward nihilism, the Catholic encyclical of Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, fails to 
allow for the possibility that so-called ‘postmodern’ thinkers might be constructively 
engaging with contemporary philosophical issues. 
23 See, for example, Frank Palmeri, “Other Than Postmodern? Foucault, Pynchon, 
Hybridity, Ethics”, Postmodern Culture 12:1 (2001); online journal available at 
http://jefferson.village.virginia.edu/pmc/text-only/issue.901/12.1palmeri.txt, accessed 
on 19/01/05. Palmeri argues that rather than being ‘postmodern’, Foucault is best 
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Couzens Hoy already argued in 1988, if Foucault’s thought is postmodern, it 
is so in a manner such that “[t]he same person, discipline, or institution can be 
traditional in some respects, modern in others, and postmodern in yet 
others.”24 As such, Foucault does not argue for a total or definitive historical 
break which would inaugurate a postmodern era, and the dilemma of 
choosing or rejecting the postmodern, and of the alternative of theology 
cautiously appropriating aspects of Foucault’s work or a Foucauldian 
theology is a false one within the perspective of Foucault’s own thought. 
 In part, the limitations of each of these first two trajectories of 
theological engagement with Foucault – application of his thought to 
theological questions and a postmodern reading of his work – can be traced to 
a number of historical factors. Firstly, during much of the 1990s, the 
phenomenological focus of the debate generated by the “theological turn” in 
continental philosophy served to obscure the possible points of intersection 
between Foucault’s more ‘genealogical’ project and theology.25 It has only 
been in recent years, as the intense engagements between thinkers like 
Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion have played out, that the exploration of the 
‘theological’ importance of the work of a wider group of ‘poststructuralist’ 
thinkers has been investigated.26 Equally, it has only been with the 
publication of Foucault’s Dits et écrits in 1994 that the full scope of Foucault’s 
project could begin to be appreciated.27 In particular, his sustained re-
                                                                                                                                            
described as ‘other than postmodern’, aiming at a “non-modern” critique concerned 
with, and imagining more possibilities for ethics and politics than postmodernism 
allows (paragraph 15ff). Also see, Foucault, “Structuralisme et poststructuralisme”, in 
DE II, 1250, 1265-66, where Foucault distances himself from postmodernism.  
24 David Couzens Hoy, “Foucault: Modern or Postmodern?”, in Jonathon Arac, ed., 
After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge and Postmodern Challenges (New Brunswick and 
London: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 12-41, at 38. 
25 Arthur Bradley, “Thinking the Outside: Foucault, Derrida and Negative Theology”, 
Textual Practice 16.1 (Spring 2002), 57-74; idem., Negative Theology and Modern French 
Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). Bradley’s article reflects a 
tendency to read Foucault through the lens of the kind of (post)phenomenological 
debate pursued by Derrida, Marion and others, and on these terms to find his 
engagement with theological questions wanting. By contrast, while Bradley’s later 
book continues to be informed by this debate, Foucault’s work is presented as 
concerned with rather different questions and a rather different project. 
26 A typical debate between Derrida and Marion is found in John D. Caputo and 
Michael J. Scanlon, eds., God, the Gift and Postmodernism (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999). For a wider engagement with 
‘postmodern’ or ‘poststructuralist’ thinkers, see, for example, Ward, ed., The 
Postmodern God: A Theological Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Frederick C. 
Bauerschmidt, “The Abrahamic Voyage: Michel de Certeau and Theology”, Modern 
Theology 12.1 (1996), 1-26; Mary Bryden, ed., Deleuze and Religion (London: Routledge, 
2001). 
27 Foucault, Dits et Écrits, 1954-1988. Ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald, 4 volumes 
(Paris Gallimard, 1994.); 2 Volumes (Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001). See Arnold I. 
123 
foucault studies, No 2, pp. 117-144 
working of the History of Sexuality series has meant that the ethical focus and 
direction of his later work has often to be reconstructed from these essays, 
lectures and interviews.28 The situation has been even more acute in relation 
to his treatment of early Christian writings as the final volume of Foucault’s 
History of Sexuality bringing to fruition his work on “the confession of the 
flesh” in early Christian practices has famously remained unpublished.29
 
A Third Trajectory: James Bernauer And Jeremy Carrette 
 
A third trajectory of exploration of the theological significance of Foucault’s 
thought has emerged in recent years and takes up the two-fold challenge and 
opportunity of the situation brought about by these developments: to engage 
with Foucault’s thought as an original and substantial, ethical project and to 
examine precisely how this project intersects with theological discourse. More 
accurately, this challenge had already been anticipated to a considerable 
extent by the philosopher James Bernauer, who attended Foucault’s lectures 
at the Collège de France in the late 1970s. As early as 1987, Bernauer had 
proposed that Foucault’s thought might be conceived of as a “negative 
theology”.30 In 1988, he co-edited a volume exploring the work of the “final 
Foucault”, which made available a substantial bibliography of Foucault’s 
works, compiled with Thomas Keenan.31 In turn, a comprehensive 1990 study 
of Foucault’s thought brought together in synthesis a sustained ethical 
interpretation of his work with Bernauer’s claim concerning Foucault’s 
“negative theology”.32 More recently, Jeremy Carrette, working in the field of 
                                                                                                                                            
Davidson, “Structures and Strategies of a Discourse: Remarks Towards a History of 
Foucault’s Philosophy of Language” in Davidson, ed., Foucault and His Interlocuters 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 1. Davidson announces how with the 
publication of these texts, “we are in a new position to begin to assess the significance 
of his work”. 
28 See, for example, Jeremy Moss, ed., The Later Foucault: Politics and Philosophy 
(Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1998); Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living: 
Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault. Sather Classical Lectures, 61 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998); Timothy O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2002). 
29 Publication of this work has been considered to be ruled out by Foucault’s 
prohibition on posthumous publications. However, the recent comments by Daniel 
Defert, cited Elden, “Review. Bernauer and Carrette, eds., Michel Foucault and 
Theology”, Foucault Studies 1 (Dec 2004), 114, suggest that, in addition, the work is in a 
less developed state than had previously been thought. 
30 James W. Bernauer, “The Prisons of Man: An Introduction to Foucault's Negative 
Theology.” International Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1987), 365-380.  
31 James W. Bernauer, and David Rasmussen, eds., The Final Foucault (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1988), See Bernauer, and Keenan, T., “The Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-
1984”, 119-158. 
32 Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics of Thought (London: 
Humanities Press International, 1990). 
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religious studies and building upon the Dits et écrits texts, as well as further 
archival research, has complemented Bernauer’s earlier studies by tracing in 
detail Foucault’s engagement with theological themes throughout the course 
of his work – what he terms the “religious subtext” of his thought. In 
addition, he has published, in English translation, a selection of Foucault’s 
essays and other writings, which bear upon the relation of religion and 
culture.33 However, aspects of Carrette’s reading of Foucault are in tension 
with those of Bernauer, not least his assertion that Foucault’s thought 
constitutes a negative theology. The dialogue between their projects has 
culminated in a co-edited volume, which seeks to bring the Foucault of this 
“second wave” of reading of his work into dialogue with mainstream 
theology, and sets the agenda for theological engagement with Foucault going 
forward.34  
 Against misunderstandings of Foucault’s project, Bernauer’s 1990 
study pays close attention to its paths, motivations and intensities, 
characterising “that thought’s fundamental experience of itself” as a coherent 
and unrelenting ethical “force of flight” beyond the imprisonments of modern 
society. Thus, beginning with Foucault’s early psychological interrogation of 
‘man’, within the framework of a Heideggerian phenomenology, Bernauer 
figures Foucault as adopting successive paradigms of thought, only, as it 
were, to think each one through to its limits – thereby revealing its contingent 
conditions of emergence and ‘negating’ its scientific claims. Thus, Foucault’s 
broadly Heideggerian approach collapses under the weight of the experience 
of thinking the ‘silence’ of a madness excluded by reason. Foucault’s 
encounter with the limits of the thinkable, and its relation of dependence to an 
‘unthought’, leads to what Bernauer describes as the “cathartic” research of 
The Order of Things, which seeks to “comprehend and purge the epistemic 
conditions determining the major principles of current knowledge in the 
human sciences”, in their relation to their subject and object, ‘man’.35 In turn, 
Bernauer traces how, sensing the instability of this recent creation, Foucault 
articulates in the late 1960s his own “dissonant” archaeological method, and 
how this transposes, in the 1970s, into a “dissident” investigation of politics, 
power, and power’s production of subjects and what counts as true. Finally, 
                                                 
33 Jeremy R. Carrette, Foucault and Religion: Spiritual Corporality and Political Spirituality 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2000). Michel Foucault, Religion and Culture, ed. 
Jeremy Carrette (New York: Routledge, 1999), 11-17.  
34 Bernauer and Carrette, eds., Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics of Religious 
Experience (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). My treatment of this collection focuses upon its 
development of the researches inaugurated by Bernauer and Carrette. For a wider 
perspective, see Stuart Elden’s review in Foucault Studies 1 (Dec. 2004), 114-115. Elden 
gives particular mention to Thomas Beaudoin article, “From Singular to Plural 
Domains of Theological Knowledge: Notes Toward a New Foucaultian Question”, 
171-190.  
35 Bernauer, Foucault’s Force of Flight, 5. 
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with Foucault’s recognition after 1976 that his own emphasis on power had 
tended to obscure the possibilities of resistance and freedom, there emerges a 
“final and culminating stage in Foucault’s development”: an “ecstatic” 
thinking, which, without returning to the modern subject, explores the 
genealogy of the desiring subject and, in particular, future ethical modes of 
thought and spaces of freedom.  
 Crucially, for Bernauer, in this final phase, Foucault’s thought most 
clearly reveals its inner impulse as a “worldly mysticism” and a “cry of spirit” 
that continually seeks freedom from the imprisonments and normalising 
power of modern society.36 Its continual discernment of, and movement 
beyond, the limits of our finite constructions of truth, achieved in “ascetic” 
practices of self and thought, suggest, for Bernauer, that Foucault’s thought 
constitutes a negative theology. This claim is not, he argues, an arbitrary one 
on his part. He points out that Foucault had suggested, in a 1967 interview, 
that the tension in his work in the 1960s had been between his passion for the 
work of writers like Blanchot and Bataille, on the one hand, and the 
structuralist analyses of Dumézil and Lévi-Strauss, on the other. The common 
denominator for both these interests, Foucault suggested, was “the religious 
problem”, allowing him to recognise that “structure, the very possibility of a 
rigorous discourse on structure, leads to a negative discourse on the 
subject…similar to Bataille’s and Blanchot’s”.37 Bernauer connects this 
statement with the explicit link made by Foucault, in his analysis of Blanchot’s 
“thought of the outside”, between his thought and the tradition of negative 
theology,38 and, with a comment of Foucault’s in a 1980 lecture, that his 
thought was like a negative theology but in relation to the human sciences 
                                                 
36 Bernauer, Foucault’s Force of Flight, 178, 183. Bernauer stresses how Foucault’s thought 
is permeated by notions such as “freeing ourselves from ourselves”, re-appropriation 
of the Enlightenment as an Ausgang, and philosophy as a way of life and an ascesis. 
See also, Bernauer, ‘Beyond Life and Death: On Foucault's Post-Auschwitz Ethic.’ 
Philosophy Today 32 (1988), 128-142. 
37 Bernauer, Foucault’s Force of Flight, 178; Foucault, “Who are you, Professor Foucault? 
Interview with P. Caruso”, in Michel Foucault, Religion and Culture, 98. 
38 Foucault, “Thought of the Outside”, in J.D. Faubian, ed., Aesthetics: Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984. Volume 2 (London: Penguin, 2000), 150. The crucial text reads: 
“One might assume that [“the thought of the outside”] was born of the mystical 
thinking that has prowled the confines of Christianity since the texts of Pseudo-
Dionysius: perhaps it survived for a millennium or so in the various forms of 
negative theology. Yet nothing is less certain: although this experience involves going 
“outside of oneself,” this is done ultimately in order to find oneself, to wrap and 
gather oneself in the dazzling interiority of a thought that is rightfully Being and 
Speech, in other words, Discourse, even if it is the silence beyond all language and 
the nothingness beyond all being.” It should be noted that Foucault does not clearly 
distinguish between negative theology and mystical theology in this context, an 
imprecision often found in his conceptualisations in the religious sphere, though this 
typically does not vitiate the force of the larger points he is making.  
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rather than God.39 He goes on to argue that while Foucault never developed 
the analogy, his critique of modern anthropocentrism is best described as a 
negative theology rather than a negative anthropology, for “man” appears 
precisely in the shadow of and as a response to the death of God.40 As he put 
it in his 1987 article, the substitution of the divine ‘I am’ with the human ‘I 
think’ involved a loss of human transcendence insofar as the historical 
happiness and perfection of the human being became the goal of thought. By 
contrast, Foucault’s thought can be understood as reopening of the possibility 




This analysis alone might suggest that while Foucault’s thought is ‘negative’ 
in structure, it constitutes a negative theology only in a circumscribed sense. 
However, Bernauer further develops the idea of Foucault’s thought as a “cry 
of spirit”. He suggests firstly that, at the time of his death, Foucault’s ethics of 
“care of the self” owed more to Christian spirituality than to the pagan 
practices of the self from which it was ostensibly derived.41 He was, Bernauer 
argues, fascinated by and “came to esteem and utilise a Christian style of 
liberty which combined a care of self with a sacrifice and mortification of that 
self.”42 Moreover, recently, Bernauer has developed the claim of Foucault’s 
debt to Christian spirituality in a slightly different direction, in an 
examination of Foucault’s final lecture at the Collège de France, which treats of 
“Christian parrhesia”.43 Framing his discussion of this material within 
Foucault’s resistance to all forms of fascism, Bernauer suggests that the 
common factor in all fascisms is “the obedient subject”.44 He argues that 
Foucault resists the “the blackmail of the enlightenment”, which presents 
itself as a new rationality liberated from what has gone before, to uncover 
how the post-Reformation period constitutes a kind of christianisation-in-
depth, firstly, within a religious “confessional” context of “pastoral power”, 
and, subsequently, within the secular context of modern “governmentality”, 
with its processes of “subjectivation”. It is against this production of obedient 
                                                 
39 Bernauer, Foucault’s Force of Flight, 178. 
40 Bernauer, Foucault’s Force of Flight, 178-183. 
41 Bernauer, “Foreword: A Cry of Spirit”, in Michel Foucault, Religion and Culture, ed. 
Jeremy Carrette (New York: Routledge, 1999), 11-17 at 14. 
42 Bermauer, “A Cry of Spirit.” 
43 Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction to the Non-
Fascist Life”, in Bernauer and Carrette, eds., Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics 
of Religious Experience (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 77-97. 
44 Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Philosophy of Religion,” 78. 
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subjects, that Foucault’s rehabilitation of parrhesia as a mode of truth-telling, 
fundamentally resistant to “confession”, finds its motivation.45  
 Much of Foucault’s final lecture course, and part of this last lecture, is 
taken up with cynic parrhesia, in particular with its radical resistance via the 
other life lived by the cynics. Of critical interest to Bernauer, however, is 
Foucault’s analysis of the transposition of this cynic parrhesia in early 
Christian thought and practice. Foucault points out how in New Testament 
texts parrhesia was, firstly, a quality of the Christian in general, precisely in 
their unspoken confidence in God, a confidence based upon obedience to 
God’s will. Secondly, it was a quality of the fearless proclamation of the 
gospel by the apostles. In the subsequent development of Christian parrhesia, 
Foucault distinguishes an anti-parrhesiastic, and essentially ascetic, pole of 
Christian thought in which “truth occurs only through the fearful obedience 
to God and the suspicious examination of oneself through temptations and 
tests,” and parrhesia constitutes “presumption”, in the theological sense of the 
term.46 The genealogy of the modern christianisation-in-depth can be traced 
to this pole of Christian thought. Alongside this tendency, and increasingly 
marginal to it, he discerns a properly parrhesiastic and mystical pole, rooted 
in confidence in God’s love. Bernauer argues that Foucault appreciated that in 
this latter pole, Christian practice brings a new dimension to parrhesia: “not 
the political and moral values of the ancient pagan world but rather the 
power of a courageous openness to mystery.”47 Moreover, he suggests that 
this Christian parrhesiastic openness to mystery reflects and casts light upon 
Foucault’s own “spirituality of persons”, whose freedom resists being 
objectivised and “is a kind of irrepressibility”.48 In support of this point, he 
cites a comment by Foucault suggesting that he was not ashamed of his 
strong Christian background nor, by implication, its influence upon his work, 
connecting this analysis to the negative theology he had previously ascribed 
to Foucault.49 Thus, while Bernauer allows that Foucault is a worldly mystic, 
and does not define Foucault’s precise relationship to theology, he 
nonetheless would seem to suggest that there is a strong, critical consonance 
between Foucault’s thought and theological concerns, such that one can speak 
of Foucault’s “philosophy of religion” as a resource for contemporary 
theological thought. 
 
                                                 
45 Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Philosophy of Religion,” 78-79.  
46 Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Philosophy of Religion,” 87. 
47 Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Philosophy of Religion,” 91. 
48 Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Philosophy of Religion,” 92-93, 
49 Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Philosophy of Religion,” 93, citing Foucault Archives, 
Document 250(7), Discussion of 21 April 1983, with Hubert Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow 
and others, 11. 
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A Catholic Foucault 
 
The nuances of this Foucault and his relation to theology are reflected, in 
Bernauer’s outline, with Carrette, of a further dimension of Foucault’s 
engagement with theological themes, which warrants further investigation. 
He and Carrette argue, that Foucault’s thinking “holds a distinctively Catholic 
dimension” in such a manner that Foucault can be understood as engaging 
with the Christian tradition and critically challenging its disciplinary regime, 
becoming at once “both guardian and adversary of the Christian faith”.50 
However, this influence of Catholicism upon his thought is filtered through 
Foucault’s own concerns, which somewhat distort his perspective on religious 
questions. Thus, his emphasis upon confession and pastoral power reflects 
Catholic theological concerns, but the former may have distorted his analysis 
of Christian sexuality. Moreover, they suggest that his view of sexuality may 
primarily reflect Foucault’s own Catholic experience of sexuality as saturated 
by sin. Again, the ‘visual’ quality of his work echoes what David Tracy has 
called the Catholic “analogical imagination”.51 His vision of the tortured 
body, at the beginning of Discipline and Punish, and of the tortured, ‘enfleshed’ 
Christian of early ascetical practices, forcefully bears upon an experience 
unfortunately not unknown to Christians. However, once more, Foucault 
does not grasp the full story, for if the body can be the register of sin, it can, 
within an incarnational worldview, also be the locus of the divine. At the 
same time, Bernauer and Carrette argue, Foucault’s practice of thought does 
have an appreciation for the finite and limited, which reflects an incarnational 
style of thought. Finally, they suggest that his re-appropriation of the 
enlightenment as a certain attitude to the present, as an ethos, and his critique 




Working in the field of religious studies, Jeremy Carrette takes the question of 
the relation of Foucault’s thought to religious themes in a somewhat different 
direction. Concerned with the reductive appropriations that plague Foucault 
scholarship, Carrette seeks to attend to the specific ways in which Foucault’s 
work itself engages with religious themes.52 In particular, he seeks to resist 
the temptation to fill out the fragmentary traces of a “religious subtext” to 
Foucault’s thought in a full-blown Foucauldian theory of religion. Moreover, 
while he detects a genuine “religious question” in Foucault’s thought, he 
                                                 
50 Bernauer and Carrette, “Introduction. The Enduring Problem: Foucault, Theology 
and Culture”, in Bernauer and Carrette, eds., Michel Foucault and Theology, 1, and for 
what follows, 5-9. 
51 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination (New York: Herder and Herder, 1998). 
52 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, ix-xi. 
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argues that it does not support a theological world-view, and considers that 
the “creative location” of Foucault’s thought within the tradition of negative 
theology is valid only as a secondary “redaction”.53 Bernauer is not 
mentioned by name here, but his work is clearly within Carrette’s sights. 
Indeed, Carrette will go on to demonstrate how unlike a negative theologian 
like Pseudo-Dionysius, for whom transcendence operates along a ‘vertical’ 
axis, Foucault uncovers and moves beyond the limits of finite discursive 
formulations ‘horizontally’, within the space of discourse.54 Moreover, 
Carrette emphasises that in comparing his thought to a negative theology 
Foucault was doing no more than suggesting certain parallels with his style of 
thought, but not aligning himself with a theological project.55 It is well to note 
that Arthur Bradley has made the even stronger point that, in his treatment of 
Blanchot’s “thought of the outside”, Foucault juxtaposes negative theology 
and the thought of the outside only to demonstrate that they could not be 
more different.56 Bradley goes on to suggest that what traces of negative 
theology remain in Foucault’s thought do so in spite of his intentions – due to 
unresolved tensions between the transcendental and historical in his 
thought.57  
 Constructively, Carrette traces in detail Foucault’s engagement, in the 
1960s, with such avant-garde thinkers as Blanchot, Bataille, and Roussel, as 
well as de Sade. In Foucault’s analysis, the death of God and man, the return 
of language and the emergence of sexuality in modernity open a space in 
which the ‘spiritual’ or ‘religious’ come to bear, in a unique manner, upon the 
body, in what Carrette terms a “spiritual corporality”.58 The sexualised (male) 
body becomes marked as the site of what Carrette terms a Sadeian 
‘theological’ anger that both protests the limits imposed by a Christian world-
view and, aided by a transgressive mode of language, signals the death of 
God, becoming at the same time the site of God’s absence. For Foucault, this 
intensified experience of the body and sexuality complicates philosophical 
                                                 
53 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, x-xi, 1. 
54 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 92 ff. 
55 Carrette, “Prologue to a Confession of the Flesh”, in Foucault, Religion and Culture, 3-
4. 
56 Bradley, Negative Theology, 118. 
57 Bradley, Negative Theology, 148-149. See Béatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: 
Between the Transcendental and the Historical (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2002), 38-69. See Thomas R. Flynn, “Partially Desacralized Spaces: the Religious 
Availability of Foucault’s Thought”, in Bernauer and Carrette, Michel Foucault and 
Theology, 143-156. Flynn suggests that Foucault protests too much the difference 
between the thought of the outside and negative theology, however, Bradley’s 
argument seems more plausible: that by this act of distancing through comparison 
Foucault enables his readers to locate and give substance to the ‘thought of the 
outside’ in relation to the broader tradition of western thought. 
58 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 44-84; for what follows see especially 63-84. 
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(and theological) discourse, creating possibilities of disruption and a space to 
think the death of God and ‘man’. For Carrette, this “bringing theology into 
the bedroom”, offers an important critique of religious discourse, 
“contaminating” it, contesting the very possibility of a religious discourse and 
experience that could avoid being transformed into this new experience of the 
body, sexuality and language.59
 While Carrette interprets Foucault as complicating religious discourse, 
at the same time, he expresses regret that Foucault’s “spiritual corporality” 
never overcomes its dependence on Sadeian models of isolation, distrust and 
anxiety and so never explores the positive possibilities for an embodied 
notion of belief that his analysis opens up.60 Instead, as he shows, Foucault’s 
interest in the ‘disciplinary’ structures of modern society in his genealogical 
period in the 1970s, together with his late interest in ethical modes of 
subjectivity, sees his concern with religious themes shift toward a “political 
spirituality” – a term Foucault first used in 1978 in relation to the Iranian 
revolution.61 Carrette can emphasise how discipline’s focus is not upon a 
direct ‘marking’ of the body, but with the formation of a ‘soul’ that is both 
cause and effect of ‘docile bodies’ suitable for governance in modern society. 
Carrette goes on to show how in his analysis of the early Christian injunction 
toward ‘confession of the flesh’, Foucault discovers how the ‘spiritual’ 
transforms and indeed constitutes the subject and explores spirituality’s 
political efficacy in the production of subjects. Thus, religious experience is 
politicised by Foucault’s thought.62 However, Carrette recognises the complex 
trajectory of Foucault’s often problematic conceptualisation of early Christian 
spiritual practices, and importantly suggests that his interest is primarily in 
the broader technologies of the self of the ancient world and their importance 
for the modern truth-governance-subjectivity conjunction. (As a consequence, 
his treatment of Christian spirituality was repeatedly pushed back, to the 
point of not being completed at the time of his death). By contrast, the central 
point of Foucault’s analysis of Christianity concerns the new relations of 
                                                 
59 Developing this aspect of Carrette’s analysis see the following articles in Bernauer 
and Carrette, eds., Michel Foucault and Theology: Carrette, “Beyond Theology and 
Sexuality: Foucault, the Self and the Que(e)rying of Monotheistic Truth”, 217-232; 
Mark D. Jordan, “Sodomites and Churchmen: The Theological Invention of 
Homosexuality”, 233-244; Michael Mahon, “Catholic Sex”, 245-266. See also, Jordan, 
The Silence of Sodom: Homosexuality in Modern Catholicism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002).  
60 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 83.  
61 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 129ff. See Michel Foucault, “Questions of Method”, in 
Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault. Volume 3. Ed. James D. Faubian 
(New York: The New Press, 2000), 223-233, at 233: most briefly excised from his text: 
“the will to discover a different way of governing oneself through a differing way of 
dividing up true and false – that is what I would call ‘political spirituality’.” 
62 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 136. 
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power it introduces.63 Hence, while not the focus of his thought, religious 
experience is implicated in his analysis and has to confront its own power-
effects and its relation to modern modes of governance. In this way, Carrette 
again strikes a significantly different note than Bernauer, maintaining the 
subtextual status of religion within Foucault’s later conception of the practice 
of thought. 
 While Foucault never integrates ‘spiritual corporality’ and ‘political 
spirituality’, Carrette can suggest a coherent direction for the critique of 
religious discourse ‘after’ Foucault. Religion must be treated as integrated 
with the culture in which it arises. Its discourse must be radically located 
socially and historically, and its belief grasped as thoroughly embodied and 
‘contaminated’ by the body and sexuality. In turn, the suffusion of religious 
discourse (and religious ‘silence’) with relations of power, its ‘micro-politics’, 
and its technologies of the self as techniques of governance must be taken 
seriously.64 However, it should be noted that Carrette is not simply providing 
a Foucauldian critique of religion – although this has radical implications, in 
its own right, for both religion and theology. For these, subtextual 
engagements with religious themes on Foucault’s part are profoundly 
integrated into Foucault’s cultural analyses and critical practice. 
Consequently, he argues, religion is shown to have rather more importance in 
cultural formation and critical thought than has typically been allowed in 
religious studies. More importantly, he detects the possibility that in the 
“absence” of religion in the contemporary world, “we are left with questions 
of how to create new forms of embodied subjectivity through a ‘spiritual 
corporality’ and a ‘political spirituality’”.65 The critical point is that “[f]rom 
this ‘absence’ a new ‘religious space’ will emerge in its disappearance.”66 In 
other words, for Carrette, Foucault’s thought does not simply provide a 
critique which might be applied in the study of religion, or to theology, but 
portrays a kind of post-religious and post-theological space to be construed 
nonetheless as the ‘religious’ and theological space available to us in the 
contemporary context. A phrase from his recent work with Richard King, 
suggests the force of what Carrette envisions, at least in embryo, here, when it 
is suggested that what we need today are “spiritual atheisms” for our time.67
 
                                                 
63 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 135-136. 
64 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 142-151. 
65 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 152. 
66 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 152. 
67 Jeremy Carrette and Richard King, Selling Spirituality: The Silent Takeover of Religion 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 182. 
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Convergence: A Foucauldian Spirituality 
 
It is clear in the context of this analysis that the Catholic dimension of 
Foucault’s thought serves, for Carrette, not to highlight Foucault’s consonance 
with a theological world-view, as Bernauer appears to suggest, but constitutes 
further religious tropes within Foucault’s thought, which reinforce his 
argument for a Foucauldian “political spirituality”. However, where the 
readings of Bernauer and Carrette converge is in their common ascription to 
the centrality of “spirituality” to Foucault’s ethico-political practice, which, in 
their recent joint work they argue, he understood “as an ensemble of practices 
that create not the mere consciousness of the subject but the very being of the 
subject and its paths of understanding.”68 Citing Foucault’s comment from 
the 1978 lecture, “What is critique?”, that “one of the first great forms of revolt 
in the west was mysticism”,69 they stress that this spirituality leads “not to an 
isolation from the world but rather a critical immersion into it and a refusal of 
its immutability”. While they recognise that mysticism can be problematic 
conceptually, they suggest that Foucault’s intellectual practice can be 
described as a “mysticism of revolt”. In particular, they connect Foucault’s 
thought with the “otherness” and “intensity of [mystical] experience”, which 
limits the claims of all categories, including theological ones, being instead 
open to “a transformative presence…which pushes the human condition to 
find new possibilities” and to resist closure.70  
 In particular, they argue that Foucault’s thought refuses to separate 
theology and culture, but reveals to theology its own conditions of 
knowledge. Foucault invites theologians to recognise that “all appeals to the 
past are but, paradoxically, an affirmation of the present political desire for 
knowledge and power about the nature of truth”. He returns theology to its 
history, shifting the focus from doctrinal systems to the pastoral reality and 
practices of its living community. “His work uncovers and destabilizes the 
unexamined authority of theological discourse and brings Christianity back to 
the fragility of human struggle.”71 Theology can be rethought as practice 
rather than belief. Consequently, they envision that a “Foucauldian spiritual 
sensibility” can lead to “a way of relating to oneself differently from modern 
                                                 
68 Bernauer and Carrette, “Foucault, Theology and Culture”, 8. It is impossible to 
determine the relation between the individual authors Bernauer and Carrette, and the 
compound author ‘Bernauer and Carrette’. This programmatic introduction reads at 
times as a composite piece, with elements of each individual’s views juxtaposed 
rather than integrated. However, their treatment of a Foucauldian spirituality 
appears a more integrated piece, though capable of a two-fold interpretation – in line 
with each of their individual projects. 
69 Foucault, “What is critique?” in The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: 
Semiotext(e), 1997), 74.  
70 Bernauer and Carrette, “Foucault, Theology and Culture,” 8-9. 
71 Bernauer and Carrette, “Foucault, Theology and Culture,” 2-4. 
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subjectivity” and can “create new spiritual communities for us to inhabit”, 





Bernauer’s work has given considerable credibility to Foucault’s work as a 
fundamentally ethical project, and, at least, has demonstrated that both in the 
late 1960s – as, indeed, Blanchot also attests73 – and the late 1970s, Foucault’s 
thought engages with themes from “negative theology”. However, in view of 
the objections of Carrette and Bradley, the problem for Bernauer is that he is 
left with the burden of demonstrating, firstly, that in these instances the 
relationship between Foucault and a negative theology is anything but 
weakly analogical, given his tangential engagement with these themes, and 
secondly, whether his thought as a whole is shaped by them. One 
contraindicative text of Foucault’s might be mentioned, in the latter regard. In 
a 1966 interview, Foucault distinguished between Hegel and Feuerbach, on 
the one hand, and Nietzsche, on the other, in relation to the question of the 
death of God. Foucault argued that, with Hegel, reason takes the place of God 
as the human spirit gradually develops, while, with Feuerbach, the illusion of 
God is replaced by “Man” who comes to realise his liberty. However, for 
Nietzsche, with whom Foucault aligns himself, “the death of God signifies the 
end of metaphysics, but God is not replaced by man, and the space remains 
empty.”74 Consequently, Foucault would appear to complicate the relation 
Bernauer asserts between the death of God and of ‘man’.  
 John Ransom goes further, in his discussion of Bernauer’s work, to 
suggest that Foucault would not only resist the description of his thought as a 
negative theology, but also the notion of a “Foucauldian spirituality”. Finding 
echoes of the vitalism Deleuze ascribes to Foucault in Bernauer’s treatment, 
he suggests that as a specific intellectual Foucault was not motivated by any 
principle of ‘life’ – or, one might suggest, human “irrepressibility” – but was 
concerned with certain concrete expressions of life, or unrealised possibilities, 
that might be affirmed or rejected.75 Of course, Foucault himself deployed the 
                                                 
72 Bernauer and Carrette, “Foucault, Theology and Culture,” 8-9. 
73 Maurice Blanchot, “Foucault as I Imagine Him”, in Foucault/Blanchot (New York: 
Zone Books, 1987), 74. 
74 Foucault, “Philosophy and the Death of God”, in Foucault, Religion and Culture, 85. It 
might be noted that this interpretation of Nietzsche, as proposing that the place of 
God remains empty, was first made, and decisively so, by Heidegger. Foucault’s 
interpretation is thus an interesting signal of the importance of Heidegger to his 
thought. See Martin Heidegger, “Nietzsche’s Word: ‘God is Dead’” (1943), in Off the 
Beaten Track (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 157-199.  
75 John Ransom, Foucault’s Discipline: The Politics of Spirituality (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 1997), 177-178. 
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notion of spirituality, but it covered both Christian and pagan practices of the 
self and thus appeared to have no specifically religious content.76 In this 
regard, Karen Vintges makes the criticism that Carrette does not take account 
of the fact that when Foucault utilises the notion of “spirituality”, he is not 
referring to religion as such, but only to “freedom practices within religion”.77 
The implicit difficulty is one to which Carrette himself adverts: how may a 
subtext of Foucault’s thought be foregrounded without distortion.78 In 
particular, the problem is that while he accepts that Foucault reduces religious 
practices to political practices, he nonetheless wants to retain a specifically 
religious force to these practices, and to suppose that Foucault’s thought 
contains a religious question.79 In Carrette’s own terms, this might be a valid 
secondary “redaction”, but appears to imbue Foucault’s notion of spirituality 
with unwarranted religious connotations. On the other hand, Vintges’ 
criticism may invert the tension in Carrette’s position somewhat, for if 
Foucault is not necessarily concerned with religion as such, neither is it clear 
that, in the genealogical context of his analyses, he can entirely abstract these 
practices from their religious contexts. It would seem rather that Derrida’s 
point is apposite here: that that, which returns, returns differently. From this 
perspective, Foucault is not an Enlightenment enemy of religion, but neither 
do the traces of the religious that emerge in his thought necessarily constitute 
a ‘religious’ space.80
 A further, complicating perspective on this notion of a Foucauldian 
spirituality is offered by Michiel Leezenberg, in his fine article on Foucault’s 
engagement with the Iranian revolution in Bernauer’s and Carrette’s recent 
volume.81 Firstly, Leezenberg’s article reinforces the point highlighted by 
Carrette that, although Foucault examines the relation of spirituality and 
politics in his later writings, his deployment of the specific concept of a 
“political spirituality” is centred on this period in the late 1970s and linked to 
Foucault’s response to the Iranian revolution – as is the concept of mysticism 
                                                 
76 See for example, Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in 
Progress”, in Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984. Volume 1, ed., Paul Rabinow 
(London: Penguin, 2000), 253-280 at 294. 
77 Karen Vintges, “Endorsing Practices of Freedom: Feminism in a Global Perspective”, 
in Dianne Taylor and Karen Vintges, eds., Feminism and the Final Foucault (Urbana 
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78 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 2. 
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80 Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of 
Reason Alone”, in Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, eds., Religion (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1998), 1-78. Derrida highlights how he is not an enemy of religion as certain 
Enlightenment thinkers were understood to be. But at the same time he has an 
“unreserved taste” for a public and democratic space of thought. (7-8) 
81 Michiel Leezenberg, “Power and Political Spirituality: Michel Foucault on the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran”, in Bernauer and Carrette, eds., Foucault and Theology, 99-115. 
135 
foucault studies, No 2, pp. 117-144 
as revolt. Moreover, Leezenberg highlights how this concept proved 
problematic for Foucault. For the Islamic revolution in Iran against state 
power, inspired and facilitated by the people’s “spirituality”, quickly gave 
way to the violence of a “bloodthirsty government of reactionary clergy.”82 
While Foucault distinguishes the two and does not posit a causal connection 
between them, the problem nonetheless remains as to the value of revolt: 
hence, his article, “Is it useless to revolt?”  
 In addition, Foucault felt it necessary to counter the threat of power 
unleashed in this context, by appeal beyond “universal principles” to 
“unbreakable law and unbridgeable rights”. Leezenberg points out that, while 
Foucault did not continue to write about the consequences of these events for 
his thought, this universalist appeal leaves him at odds with his earlier 
analytic of power. He suggests that this uncomfortable situation arises 
because there are traces of a domination-resistance dichotomy still at work in 
Foucault’s thought. It seems reasonable to extend Leezenberg’s comments by 
suggesting that the very idea of a “spirituality” or a “mysticism of revolt” 
reflects this dichotomy, tending as it does toward constituting what Foucault 
called a moment “outside history”.83 As Leezenberg’s analysis suggests, 
Foucault, at least at first, did not recognise the relations of power already at 
play in this “spiritual” revolt. If Foucault’s later investigation of ancient pagan 
and Christian writings is informed, at least in part, by this difficulty, then it is 
arguable that, although he recognises the deep impact of Christian spirituality 
upon western subjectivity, Foucault’s later focus is not upon a specifically 
religious or mystical “spirituality” as a potential paradigm of his own 
thought. In any case, theological readings of his work need to be careful of not 
going beyond Foucault’s deployment of the term.  
 It is beyond the scope of this article to address these questions in any 
detail. However, a somewhat different construal, to that provided by 
Bernauer, of Foucault’s treatment of Christian parrhesia in his final lecture at 
the Collège de France may suggest something of the potential complication of 
ascribing a religious, mystical or Christian style of “spirituality” to Foucault 
in light of these later writings.84 The larger context of Foucault’s discussion of 
Christian parrhesia, as has been noted, is his sustained exploration of cynic 
parrhesia, in which Foucault clearly finds a practice and “problematisation” 
of thought in relation to which he can think through several of his own critical 
concerns. As the course progresses, one of Foucault’s concerns is with 
precisely how this cynic practice, itself marginal in its time and leaving no 
                                                 
82 Michiel Leezenberg, “Power and Political Spirituality,” 110; See Foucault, “Is it 
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canon of writings, might conceivably have constituted part of the genealogy 
of western truth-telling, and thus constitute an effective “problematisation” of 
thought within that tradition today. Foucault’s treatment of Christian 
parrhesia occurs within a genealogical sequence of analyses which trace the 
manner in which cynicism is absorbed into Western thought and yet 
dynamically transmits certain parrhesiastic values.85 Thus, prior to his analysis 
of Christian parrhesia, Foucault examines at length how cynic themes emerge 
and are transformed in the thought of the Stoic Epictetus. And, at least in 
outline, he projects a history of that transmission and transformation of these 
themes beyond Christian practices of the self to nineteenth century 
revolutionary politics and to certain forms of twentieth century art.86 Thus, 
although, due to time pressure at the end of this final lecture, Foucault 
concludes with a treatment of Christian attitudes to parrhesia and, indeed, 
with the idea that parrhesia survived on the margins of the Christian tradition 
in mystical practices, caution is in order when discerning in the spirituality of 
Christian mystical parrhesia an element critical to Foucault’s practice of 
thought. 
 Moreover, certain of his remarks suggest that Foucault had a more 
circumspect attitude than Bernauer supposes to Christianity’s mystical and 
parrhesiastic pole. Certainly, he saw in the trembling obedience of the anti-
parrhesiastic and ascetical pole of Christian thought the genealogical origin of 
“pastoral power”. And he asserted that where there is obedience, there cannot 
be parrhesia.87 However, the relation Foucault proposes between the 
parrhesiastic and anti-parrhesiastic poles appears to be a complex one. For it 
is a tension at the heart of the parrhesiastic pole that ultimately gives rise to 
its anti-parrhesiastic alternative. Foucault had argued that in the New 
Testament parrhesia signifies confidence in God, but that this confidence is 
one which asks nothing other than that which God wants, that is, that it 
depends fundamentally upon the notion that human will is in practice 
nothing other than the reduplication of God’s will. In Foucault’s judgment, 
this circular dynamic of belief follows a principle of obedience.88 However, he 
goes on to argue that the positive pole of Christian parrhesia which combines 
this confidence with the apostolic courage exhibited in proclaiming the 
                                                 
85 This is not to suggest an underlying parrhesia that persists through history, but 
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86 Foucault, Lecture of 1 February 1984, 45-51. For the structure and outline of 
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gospel, continues to be marked by this principle of obedience. And ultimately, 
it will only require loss of confidence in the human will’s capacity to 
reduplicate the divine will to open the way to the troubling anti-parrhesiastic 
‘confession of the flesh’.89  
 Moreover, when Foucault speaks of the survival of parrhesia in the 
Christian mystical tradition, he refers specifically to the survival of this 
Christian parrhesia of confidence in God. As such, he does not appear to 
valorise the Christian mystical tradition as preserving and extending the cynic 
notion of parrhesia, as such, but more modestly of preserving this parrhesia of 
confidence in and obedience to God.90 Indeed, when he highlights the 
manifestation of parrhesia within the Christian tradition, he does not appear 
to discern any specifically religious or mystical element within it.91 Reference 
might also be made here to Bernauer’s suggestion that Foucault adopts a 
Christian form of liberty which combined care and renunciation of self. In 
light of this final lecture course, it would seem that Foucault also finds in 
cynic parrhesia a vision of a life in which much is ‘renounced’ in order to live 
the true ‘other’ life, to ethico-political ends in the social sphere. An interesting 
and important question is how Foucault’s Christian and cynic researches 
intersect on this topic.92  
 Beyond questions of interpretation of his work, Bernauer’s and 
Carrette’s arguments for a Foucauldian ‘spirituality’ raise a broader 
theological issue, one already raised within the ‘postmodern’ approach to 
Foucault. To speak of a Foucauldian ‘spirituality’ risks a subtle re-inscription 
of the modern relation of theology and philosophy. For to argue for a 
Foucauldian ‘spirituality’ consonant with the Christian tradition as Bernauer 
appears to do, or to understand Foucault as offering a refigured notion of 
spirituality as Carrette seems to suggest, is to echo postures from modern and 
postmodern theology (the latter in turn repeating modern dichotomies). One 
approaches a situation in which Foucault, on the one hand, can be allowed to 
shape theological discourse because his work ultimately resonates with its 
own deepest concerns and traditions, or, on the other, so defines the 
contemporary space of theological thought, that theology must take his 
lessons to heart: the alternative of a theological Foucault or a Foucauldian 
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theology. Of course, against this trace in their work and balancing it, both 
Bernauer and Carrette each brilliantly articulate Foucault’s capacity 
continually to generate profoundly new spaces of theological thought, so that 
Foucauldian “spirituality” does not simply constitute a modernist critique but 
continually opens theology to new possibilities.93 However, an important 
tension remains, which tends variously to articulate the value of Foucault’s 
thought for theology at the expense of his distance from it.  
 By contrast, the work of Foucault’s contemporary, Michel de Certeau, 
suggests the outline of an alternative formulation. His thought is framed, on 
the one hand, by the theological question of how Christianity is thinkable 
today and, on the other, by a broadly ‘poststructuralist’ project not entirely 
dissimilar to that of Foucault. As Bradley has elaborated, de Certeau’s 
thought seeks an answer to his theological question by risking engagement 
with the otherness of contemporary thought, conceived as irreducible to 
either ‘sameness’ or ‘difference’, such that to engage with it is to risk the 
certainty that the ‘theology’ which emerges “is truly Christianity at all” (or, 
one might add, ‘spiritual’ or ‘religious’), for one has the assurance neither that 
the other is ultimately of the same order as oneself nor that identity can be 
secured in giving oneself over to the other.94 De Certeau’s “mundane other” 
is, rather, at every point an irreducible admixture of both likeness and 
difference,95 and applied to Foucault allows for a reading of his work as at a 
distance in his consonances with and consonant in his distances from 
theology. Consequently, beyond the apologetic terms of modern thought, 
theology might be at once shaped by Foucault without becoming 
Foucauldian, and might constitute a “theological theology” while, at the same 
time, unable to circumscribe what Derrida might describe as the spectral 
challenge of Foucault’s thought.96
 
Theologies “After” Foucault  
 
Two recent, constructive theologies ‘after’ Foucault take up interesting 
perspectives in relation to the work of Bernauer and Carrette and to these 
questions. Firstly, J. Joyce Schuld, within the field of “Christian cultural 
analysis”, pursues a sustained conversation between Foucault and Augustine, 
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on the basis of the parallels she discovers, on a performative level, between 
Foucault’s notion of power and Augustine’s notion of love.97 Like Bernauer 
and Carrette, Schuld presents Foucault as an ethical thinker with whom 
theology can confidently engage, for Foucault’s ethos of “being pessimistic 
without being hopeless”, “comports well with much of the Christian 
tradition.”98 However, at the same time, she preserves a distance between the 
“Foucault, the atheist” and Christian thought, by a sophisticated cross-
reading which aims to explore the resonances and exploit the differences 
between these two thinkers to the benefit of both of their projects, and 
without reducing the distinctiveness of their insights and approaches. In 
particular, she demonstrates how, as relational, dispersed, and productive, 
Augustinian love demonstrates operative parallels with Foucauldian power, 
and how love’s emphasis upon the personal and power’s attention to the 
social might complement one another to suggest a rich and varied network of 
relations constitutive of our personal and social space. In this manner, 
Foucault’s and Augustine’s respective social and (inter)personal emphases to 
extend, in a kind of cross-contamination, “the geographic reach” of each 
other’s analyses, Foucault extending Augustine’s analysis deeper into the 
social and political spheres, the latter’s notion of love introducing a richer 
grammar of human relationality – one possessing a “generative” capacity in 
relation to human possibility that the political heritage of the term ‘power’ 
necessarily denies it. In Schuld’s view, then, through this cross-reading, 
Foucault and Augustine can better attend to the complexities and ambiguities 
of the social and political spheres, and a common commitment to attending to 
the dangers and vulnerabilities associated with them.  
 Moreover, while maintaining the distance between their works, Schuld 
is able to highlight their common elaboration, against the autonomous 
subject, of what might be termed a vulnerable subjectivity and an associated 
ethics. A striking comparison of the operative functioning of Augustine’s 
theology of original sin and Foucault’s view of world pervaded by power 
relation enables Schuld to highlight how each thinker delineates a social space 
in which evil is anonymous and yet permeates its most infinitesimal 
‘capillaries’ and processes.99 More importantly she shows how both Foucault 
and Augustine articulate a sense of human agency and responsibility within 
this social space, responsive to the human vulnerability and moral ‘vertigo’ 
experienced within it. Subsequently, this comparison is extended to articulate 
the parallels and distinctive emphases of each thinker in relation to desire and 
habit, dominant discourses and politics. 
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 In all of this, Schuld demonstrates a significant alternative to the 
approach of Bernauer and Carrette, in that the consonance of Foucault’s 
thought with theological concerns is not at the expense of his distance from 
theology. Foucault emerges as something approaching de Certeau’s 
“mundane other”, whose thought demonstrates an irreducible mix of 
parallels to and differences from theology. At one point, however, Schuld’s 
approach is rather more problematic. She claims that no “metanarrative 
pressures” are exerted at the performative level of power and love by 
Foucault’s and Augustine’s larger projects: for all of the differences between 
them, their analyses are ultimately not incompatible.100 This correlates with 
Schuld’s interpretation, inspired by aspects of the broader American reception 
of his thought, of Foucault’s “specific researches” as “intentionally partial 
social descriptions” that are “empirical” in nature and “utterly uninterested in 
all-encompassing interpretations”, “bracketing” rather then disqualifying 
broader questions. This enables her to present Foucault as attending to 
“forgotten voices” in a manner “suited to detecting and responding to the 
shifting risks of a post-modern world”, while being able to locate his thought 
as “colourful fragments” within a more “intricate and extensive mosaic”.101 
Consequently, Schuld deprives Foucault’s thought of a crucial dimension of 
its critical force, for in her conception, his analyses of power no longer bears 
upon the “ontological and evaluative center” of Augustine’s thought.102 
Nevertheless, her larger “cross-reading” is a sophisticated and promising 
innovation in theological engagement with Foucault’s work. 
 In turn, Henrique Pinto utilises Foucault’s work to construct a theology 
of interfaith dialogue that moves beyond, what he takes to be, Catholic 
theology’s construction and rejection of other religions as the ‘other’ of its 
absolute religious claims.103 Integrating Foucault’s earlier work with his later 
ethical concerns, Pinto stresses how Foucault continually brings to light how 
‘truth’ stands in a relation to specific contexts and relations of power and 
hence is always finite, or rather a “finite infinity”.104 He shows how Foucault 
brings to light how we tend to absolutise truth in a manner inconsistent with 
its finitude and specificity. Drawing on the deployment of the term in the 
Archaeology of Knowledge, Pinto argues that for Foucault, the very structure of 
language is that there is always a ‘more’ that escapes what we intend to say or 
designate by language. This ‘more’ is what remains yet to be thought and that 
which undermines and disrupts our efforts to ‘possess’ the truth as something 
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definitive and absolute.105 Pinto exploits this term to generate a sophisticated 
theological reading of Foucault. As he acknowledges, Foucault’s ‘more’ is not 
the divine. However, in a post-metaphysical context, this recommends a 
theological interpretation. For ‘the More’, as Pinto writes the term, does not 
suggest a “region beyond knowledge”, nor “something prior to the sentences 
we speak”, nor a God “beyond history in the shadows of its laws.”106 Instead, 
as the openness or opening of language to the unthought, it is the locus of 
human-divine relation in history. As such, Pinto can avoid all dualism in 
speaking of the divine. In a sustained dialogue with the work of such diverse 
thinkers as Meister Eckhart, Milbank, and Marion, Pinto constructs a model of 
interfaith dialogue in which the absence of a ‘God beyond reality’ (which 
would allow us to absolutise our truth claims) shifts the focus from polemic to 
a dialogical ‘being-with-other-faiths’. Pinto does not envisage an overcoming of 
differences but that each tradition would recognise that no religious figure  
 
is an exhaustive embodiment of the More lavishing existence, and that life in 
relation to them, is not about finding the divine hidden in them and 
conforming to it, but about becoming the difference of ourselves through the 
sacrificial transformation of our theological positions, in response to the 
demands of the More – as we hear it calling in the practice of ourselves and in 
the making of society.107
 
The creativity of Pinto’s reading of Foucault is that he does not have to 
suggest that Foucault, despite his own intentions, articulated an opening to 
the theological. There is a perfect consistency, for Pinto, in his own and 
Foucault’s readings of the ‘more’: Foucault’s reading lacks nothing for not 
recognising the ‘more’ as the locus of divine-human relations in history, while 
Pinto’s in a sense adds nothing. Its avoidance of dualism also has much to 
recommend this approach theologically.  
 However, his interpretation of the ‘more’ does tend to dissolve the 
distance between Foucault and theology so carefully articulated here. Where 
in The Archaeology of Knowledge the term refers to the discursive dimension of 
language beyond words power to name things, Pinto discovers an “untamed 
exteriority”108 more reflective of Foucault’s explorations of the ‘thought of the 
outside’ than his later ethics and echoes contested elements of the notion of a 
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Foucauldian spirituality highlighted in relation to Bernauer’s and Carrette’s 
work. In particular, that Pinto parallels Foucault’s ‘more’ to Derrida’s 
‘différance’ signals a shift from ascribing importance to particular experiences 
and specific discursive and power formations to focusing upon the ‘openings’ 
of a quasi-transcendentally structured language.109 The theological 
importance of this is that, while Pinto does not wish to see religious 
differences overcome in religious dialogue, this emphasis on the More alters 
the dynamic relation between the particularities of tradition and the 
‘transcendence’ which it enacts, in favour of the latter. Nonetheless, we find 
here once more – albeit less strongly than in Schuld – the perception of a 
Foucault at a persistent distance from, yet intersecting with, theology, and an 
effort to think the resultant admixture of consonance and dissonance.  
 
Conclusion: Future Lines Of Development 
 
While tracing the evolution of theological engagement with Foucault’s 
thought, this article has concentrated upon Bernauer’s and Carrette’s critical 
explorations of the intersection of Foucault’s thought with Christian 
theological themes, as these investigations more than any others have laid the 
basis for a theological dialogue with his thought. Their recent work, in its 
achievements and difficulties, highlights how evaluation of the significance of 
Foucault’s deployment of the term ‘spirituality’, and the extent of its 
‘religious’ and ‘mystical’ connotations, will be crucial to the dialogue between 
theology and Foucault going forward. Further exploration of the Catholic 
dimension of Foucault’s thought, highlighted by them, and the ongoing 
examination of Foucault’s later writings will be central to this process. 
However, the constructive theologies ‘after’ Foucault of Schuld and Pinto 
reflect a broader persistent theological intuition of, and caution toward, the 
distance of Foucault’s thought from theology and suggest the need to arrive at 
a style of theological engagement which allows that difference its proper 
place. It is perhaps time, therefore, to engage with thinkers like Derrida and 
de Certeau, who have grappled more explicitly with theoretical questions 
surrounding the intersection of poststructuralist thought and theology, 
toward the construction of new paradigms of theological engagement with 
Foucault’s thought. Finally, this article has reflected the fact that theological 
engagement with the thought of Michel Foucault has essentially taken place 
within the Christian tradition. However, as Bernauer suggests, Foucault’s 
trips to Japan in 1970 and 1978, and their importance for the development of 
his understanding of religion, open up the possibility of a dialogue with 
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eastern religions.110 In addition, Leezenberg’s discussion of Foucault’s 
engagement with Islam via the Iranian revolution suggests the possibility of a 
further expansion of religious dialogue with his work. However, the limits of 
Foucault’s appreciation of the religious dimension of that event, and the 
apparent limits of his analytic of power as a critical tool to understand it, 
suggests a difficult though potentially rewarding dialogue. 
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